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Term limits at the federal level are deeply rooted in the American political system.  In fact, the 
idea of instituting constraints on legislative terms was first developed by the Second Continental 
Congress in the authoring of the Articles of Confederation in 1777.1  One provision of the Articles 
of Confederation prohibited congressmen from serving more than three years in a six-year period.2  
Although it was later abandoned with the adoption of the United States Constitution, this provision 
is illustrative of inherent public skepticism towards powerful political leaders who remain at their 
posts for an unlimited period.3  The concern regarding the concentration of power in the hands of 
few and fear of corrupt and overzealous politicians was influential in the structure of American 
government.  These strong public sentiments were likely developed as a result of England’s 
monarchy.  Additionally, in 1951, the passage of the Twenty-second Amendment to the 
Constitution limited the President to hold no more than two terms in office.4
 
  Innate public distrust 
is still a constant theme in the background of American politics and is especially dominant today 
in the state initiative and referendum process. 
The popular push for and subsequent imposition of state legislative terms limits is a 
relatively recent grass roots movement, gaining popularity among the electorate in the 1990s.5  
“With high name recognition and the ability to raise more money than challengers, incumbents 
were virtually invulnerable during the 1980s . . . Limiting Assembly and Senate terms, it was 
hoped, would increase the rotation into and out of office and change the background and 
perspectives of those serving in the Legislature.”6  In 1990, initiatives limiting legislative terms 
were passed in the first states:  California, Colorado, and Oklahoma.7  Since then, eighteen more 
states have adopted term limits.8  However, in six of those states – Idaho, Massachusetts, Oregon, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming – terms limits were repealed by the legislature or the state 
supreme court.9
                                                 
1 Sasha Horwitz, Termed Out: Reforming California’s Legislative Term Limits, CTR. GOVTL. STUD., 5 (October 2007), 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2047.pdf. 




5 Horwitz at 5. 
6 Bruce E. Cain and Thad Kousser, Adapting to Term Limits: Recent Experiences and New Directions, PUB. POLICY 
INST. OF CAL., 5 (November 2004), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1104BCR.pdf. 
7 Legislative Term Limits: An Overview, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (accessed February 12, 
2012), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/legislative-term-limits-overview.aspx. 





Because the advent of term limit provisions on state legislatures is a new step in reforming 
the political system, term limits have more recently begun to “kick-in” and consequently, the 
number of legislators termed out is dramatically increasing.10  As term limits begin to take effect, 
the debate on the impact of term limits on state legislatures is becoming controversial.  Generally, 
proponents market terms limits as an essential check on “career” politicians, a mechanism 
bringing “new blood and fresh ideas to state legislatures” and a tool curbing corruption by 
lessening exposure to outside influences.11  On the other hand, opponents point to the undeniable 
lack of experience in the state legislatures, which diminishes expertise in important policy areas.12   
Additionally, critics contend the inability to vote for the candidate of one’s choice is an 




II. TERM LIMIT INITIATIVES DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
 
The state supreme courts of Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, and Wyoming have ruled 
unconstitutional specific term limit provisions, all of which were enacted through the initiative 
process.14  Consequently, despite efforts by U.S. Term Limits, a national non-profit organization 
dedicate to lobbying for term limit legislation, each state has yet to reinstate term limits.15
 
    
A. 
Oregon’s Ballot Measure 3, the “Term Limit Initiative,” passed in 1992 contained two key 
provisions.
Oregon 
16  One provision set limits on the terms for most statewide political officeholders and 
state legislatures, while the other set limits on the terms for Oregon’s Congressional 
representatives.17  Although the United States Supreme Court in U.S Term Limits v. Thorton, found 
state-imposed qualifications on federal Congressional offices unconstitutional, the Oregon 
Supreme Court went on to find the Oregon initiative also violated the separate vote requirement of 
the state constitution, which requires state constitutional amendments to be voted on separately.18  
Measure 3 was ultimately held unconstitutional.19
                                                 
10 Legislative Term Limits: An Overview. 
  
11 Horwitz at 1, 5.   
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997). 
14 The Term Limited States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (accessed February 12, 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx. 
15 State Legislative Term Limits, U.S. TERM LIMITS (accessed February 12, 2012), 
http://www.termlimits.org/content.asp?pl=18&sl=19&contentid=19. 
16 Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 231, 233 (2002). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 




In 1998, the Washington Supreme Court ruled Initiative 573 unconstitutional.  The 
Washington measure was passed in 1992 and effectively restricted certain incumbent federal and 
state officials from running for office by prohibiting their candidacy filing and ballot appearance.
Washington 
20  
The Court found the initiative explicitly established non-incumbency as a “qualification” for 
political office.21  Consequently, because Initiative 573 was a statutory enactment and not an 
amendment to the Washington Constitution, the Court held it “improperly attempts to add 




The Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated a 1994 initiative, entitled Question 4
Massachusetts 
23, 
“which purported to limit the number of consecutive terms a public officer could be listed on . . . 
ballots . . . and to eliminate pay, perquisites, and privileges of certain officers if reelected after 
serving specified number of consecutive terms.”24   Again, because the term limits were 
established through the statutory initiative process, the initiative constituted an unconstitutional 
change to the Constitution of the Commonwealth.  The Court noted key differences between a 
statutory initiative and an initiative for constitutional change, which hinge on legislative action.25  
In fact, previous “efforts to obtain term limits by a constitutional amendment foundered in 1992 
because of the refusal of the Legislature in joint session to take final action on such a proposal as 
the Constitution of the Commonwealth directed.”26  Consequently, because the statutory initiative 
process requires no joint session, it directly conflicts with the amendment process explicitly 




In 1992, Wyoming voters passed Initiative 2, limiting the terms of state and federal 
officeholders.
Wyoming 
28  Using similar reasoning as Washington and Massachusetts, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court concluded, “The inherent and reserved powers of the people do not include, under 
this constitution, the right to enact via the initiative a law that could not be enacted by the 
legislature.”29  The Court went on to interpret the intent of the framers of the Wyoming 
Constitution, and concluded the constitutional qualifications for holding office are unambiguously 
exclusive.30  Accordingly, because the Court reasoned the language of the constitution clearly 
mandates no law, whether enacted by the legislature or through the initiative process, may impose 
conditions on the right to hold political office, the initiative was declared unconstitutional.31
                                                 
20 Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 191-193 (1998). 
  
21 Gerberding, 143 Wash. 2d at 201. 
22 Id. at 211. 
23 Massachusetts Term Limits Initiative, Question 4 (1994), BALLOTPEDIA (April 2, 2012), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Massachusetts_Term_Limits_Initiative,_Question_4_(1994). 
24 League of Women Voters of Mass. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 425 Mass. 424, 424 (1997). 
25 Id. at 431. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 432. 
28 Wyoming Term Limits. Initiative 2 (1992), BALLOTPEDIA (April 2, 2012), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Wyoming_Term_Limits,_Initiative_2_(1992). 
29 Cathcart v. Myer, 88 P.3d 1050, 1067 (Wyo. 2004). 
30 Id. at 1068. 
31 Id. 
 
Lastly, the Wyoming Supreme Court went on to conclude, “The fact that seventy-seven percent of 
the voters favored a particular measure does not make that measure constitutional.  Either we live 
under a constitutional government or we do not.”32
 
   
 
III. CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA  
 
As one of the first states to enact term limits through an initiative constitutional 
amendment, California’s history with term limit initiatives has been at the forefront of the debate 
on legislative reform.  The state provides a thorough example of the public policy goals behind 
term limits as well as reveals the unintended and perhaps negative consequences of such 
initiatives.   
 
A. 
Prior to the passage of the current term limit law, the California Constitution had no 
provisions regarding how many terms elected officials could serve in the State Senate or State 
Assembly.
Proposition 140 and the Current Law 
33  Until the enactment of Proposition 140 in 1990, “it was not uncommon for California 
legislators to hold office for twenty years or more.”34  The passage of Proposition 140, which 
enacted the current law in California limiting legislative terms, reflected the public’s wariness 
towards politicians and the hope to eliminate “incumbency advantages.”35  Proponents argued the 
political system unchecked by term limits “had undermined fair elections, preventing regular party 
turnover and perpetuating the political careers of professional politicians who were increasingly 
out of touch with the concerns of average Californians.”36
 
  
1. Provisions of Proposition 140 
Due to the passage of Proposition 140 with 52.17% of the vote, the California Constitution 
was amended to limit members of the California State Assembly to three two-year terms and 
members of the California State Senate to two four-year terms.37  Additionally, the current law 
mandates a lifetime ban on past legislators seeking the same office in the future if the term limits 
have already been reached.38  Interestingly, Proposition 140 appeared on the same ballot as the 
competing Proposition 131 (also known as the “Limits on Terms of Office, Ethics, Campaign 
Financing Act”), which was backed by Ralph Nader and defeated by 62.25% of the vote.39  
Proposition 131 attempted to limit the number of consecutive terms elected state officials could 
serve, but did not impose a lifelong ban.40
                                                 
32 Id. at 1067-1068. 
  Arguably, the decision of California voters to impose 
33 Horwitz at 5. 
34 Isabel Liou and Tyler McKinney, Proposition 93: Term Limits and Legislative Reform Act, Cal. Init. Rev. (Fall 
2007). 
35 Cain and Kousser at 5. 
36 Id. 
37 California Term Limits, Proposition 140 (1990), BALLOTPEDIA (February 12, 2012), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Term_Limits,_Proposition_140_(1990). 
38 Id. 




the stricter initiative (with respect to term limits) sheds light on the sentiment of the electorate, 
specifically the desire to bring new faces to the Legislature and to eliminate the veterans. 
 
2. Constitutional Challenges to Proposition 140 
Opponents of Proposition 140 attempted to challenge its constitutionality in two major 
cases.41  In Legislature v. Eu, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 
effect of Proposition 140 was an improper constitutional revision versus a proper constitutional 
amendment.42  In distinguishing between the two, courts examine the extent of “the quantitative 
and qualitative effects of the measure on our constitutional scheme,” which could amount to a 
revision.43  Concluding the proposition to have the effect of a constitutional amendment, the 
California Supreme Court stated, “Proposition 140 on its face does not affect either the structure or 
the foundational powers of the Legislature . . . ”44  Furthermore, the Court found no violation of 
the single-subject rule.45  Additionally, it held the proposition was not an “unwarranted 
infringement on the rights to vote and seek public office . . . ”46  However, the California Supreme 
Court did invalidate the provisions limiting pension and retirement benefits for incumbents as an 
“impairment to contract”.47  It went on to hold the remaining provisions constitutionally sound, 
and severable “since they can be given effect without regard to the validity or operation of the 
invalid pension restriction.”48
 
   
In Bates v. Jones, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed 
whether Proposition 140 infringed upon Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, specifically “the right to vote for the candidate of 
one’s choice and the asserted right of an incumbent to again run for his or her office.”49  The Bates 
Court employed a test outlined by the United States Supreme Court, to determine constitutionality: 
“We must ‘weigh’ the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment . . .’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.’”50  In Bates, the Court described term limits on 
state officeholders to be a “neutral candidacy qualification”, similar to age or residence.51  
Additionally, it found lifetime term limits to be a nondiscriminatory restriction because 
Proposition 140 made “no distinction on the basis of the content of protected expressions, party 
affiliation, or inherently arbitrary factors such as race, religion, or gender.”52  With regards to the 
right to vote for the candidate of one’s choice, the Court held the measure did not discriminate 
against any one specific political group sharing a particular ideology.53
                                                 
41 Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991); Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997). 
  Therefore, the Court 
42 Legislature, 54 Cal. 3d 492. 
43 Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 350 (1990). 
44 Legislature, 54 Cal. 3d at 509. 




49 Bates, 131 F.3d at 847 (9th Cir. 1997). 
50 Id. at 846 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). 




applied the rational basis test, ruling “Proposition 140’s minimal impact on the plaintiff’s rights is 
justified by the State’s legitimate interest” in guarding against unfair advantages to incumbents.54
 
 
However, it is worth noting the concurring opinions of the divided Bates decision with 
regards to the appropriate test – rational basis or strict scrutiny – to be applied to Proposition 140’s 
infringement on Constitutional rights.  In her concurring opinion, Judge Rymer asserted the State’s 
interest to be even stronger, arguing because Californian voters exercised their state “constitutional 
right to chose the form of their representation in the legislative  
branch . . . they acted in accordance with the Constitution’s guarantee that citizens of each state 
shall have the right to determine the structure of their own government so long as it is republican 
in form.”55  Therefore, Judge Rymer concluded lifetime term limits to be “presumptively 
constitutional” because the State’s interest in structuring its government is explicitly rooted in the 
Constitution, surviving “whatever scrutiny is required.”56
 
 
Interestingly, Judge Fletcher’s opinion in Bates – concurring in part and dissenting in part 
– questions the majority’s quick assumption that Proposition 140 is not per se discriminatory 
against any particular class of voters.57  Judge Fletcher entertains the argument that the measure 
discriminates against a class of voters “who value legislative experience, not merely for the 
incumbency-based benefits that it can confer upon fortunate districts, but as a political and 
ideological reason for selecting a representative.”58  While acknowledging a compelling State 
interest and Constitutional guarantee to experiment with structures of republican government, 
Judge Fletcher argued for a future application of strict scrutiny if Proposition 140 proves to 
disadvantage such a particular class of voters.59
 
 
Nevertheless, the defeats of the Constitutional challenges to Proposition 140 in both 
federal and state court reveal that any aims to extend California’s legislative term limits are 
unlikely to be attained through the court system.  It has become exceedingly clear that the only 
way to repeal California’s current law is through another successful initiative constitutional 
amendment. 
 
3. Impact of Proposition 140 
As previously discussed, the main public policy goals behind Proposition 140 focused on a 
“means to promote democracy by opening up the political process and restoring competitive 
elections.”60
 
  Californian voters sought to bring newcomers to the political system as well as curb 
the powerful influences of lobbyists and special interests.  
Two different comprehensive studies done by the Public Policy Institute of California and 
the Center for Governmental Studies, conducted in 2004 and 2007 respectively, both found an 
increase in the number of minority officials since the enactment of Proposition 140.  However, the 
cause of such results may also be attributed to national movements championing minority rights, 
                                                 
54 Bates, 131 F.3d at 847. 
55 Id. at 855. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 871. 
58 Id.  
59 Bates, 131 F.3d at 873. 
60 Id. at 847. 
 
growing populations, and the 1991 Special Masters report on redistricting, which was “influential 
in opening opportunities to minorities by creating more minority-majority districts.”61  
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that when term limits took effect in 1996, “minority gains rose to 
thirty-three new members in the Senate and nine in the Assembly” in just six years.62  
Additionally, an increase in women leadership was apparent with respect to their influence and 
presence as committee chairs.63  Lastly, even opponents are unable to deny that term limits have 
opened up more opportunities for newcomers overall: “From 1990 through 2008, 369 individuals 
will have served in the legislature compared to 296 for the prior equivalent eighteen year period 
preceding term limits (1970-1988).”64
 
 
Unfortunately, any initial increase of female influence in the California legislature was 
short-lived.  A recent Sacramento Bee article, while acknowledging the state legislature is 
expected to open up seats for a record number of newcomers this fall due in part to term limits, 
contends “the same forces . . . are expected to cause the number of women elected to state office to 
drop for the third consecutive cycle.”65  Women currently fill only thirty-four of 120 legislative 
seats and the number is projected to decline further as nine of those women are being termed out 
and thus ineligible to run in the upcoming election.66  The article points to an analysis, by Scott 
Lay of AroundtheCapitol.com, which estimates as many as eight of the seats currently held by 
females are in danger of being lost to males in November.67  Additionally, while nine races are 
expected to include women, the favored candidates in a majority are men.68
 
  These projections are 
certainly disheartening, and are evident of a concrete failed goal of Proposition 140.  
Additionally, Proposition 140 has done little to curb the influence of lobbyists or special 
interests.  In fact, many new legislators often turn to lobbyists for guidance.  “A few members 
confessed over ninety percent of their bills were drafted or given to them by lobbyists.”69  
Additionally, the quality and expertise of legislators, specifically with regards to policy and the 
budget as well as the experience level of committee chairs, has been affected.  One 
Assemblywomen stated, “I felt like I was just beginning to become an effective member at the end 
of my third term . . . ”70  She went on to admit the complexity she felt towards the overwhelming 
state budget despite her experience in local government, and estimated that she would “need ten 
years to learn enough to make a difference.”71   Furthermore, critics contend terms limits 
compromise oversight of the executive branch and “erase the institutional memory necessary to 




                                                 
61 Horwitz at 16. 
Efforts to Extend the Term Limits Imposed by Proposition 140 
62 Cain and Kousser at 10. 
63 Horwitz at 19. 
64 Id. at 13. 





69 Cain and Kousser at 17. 
70 Id. at 16. 
71 Cain and Kousser at 17. 
72 Id. at 72. 
 
In response to the negative effects and unintended consequences of Proposition 140, there 
have been two past initiatives and one initiative on the upcoming June 2012 ballot aimed at 
extending (although not eliminating) term limits for Californian legislators.   One common goal of 
these three measures is to allow more time for elected public officials to learn and adapt to the 
political process.   
 
For example, Proposition 45 (defeated in March 2002), sought to give incumbents who 
were termed out an opportunity to run for one additional term in the Senate or two additional 
terms in the Assembly.73  Although ultimately defeated by 57.7% of the vote74, the language of the 
proposition acknowledged term limits as having “reinvigorated the political process by promoting 
full participation and bringing a breath of fresh air to California government.”75  However, it went 
on to justify a change to the current system: “Proposition 45 recognizes that sometimes there are 
times of crisis and challenge when voters should have the option of extending the term of 
responsive and capable leaders.  Today, stable leadership and the ability to solve complex 
problems, like a faltering economy, are of great importance.”76
 
  Proposition 45 demonstrated a 
gradual shift in public opinion, expressing a desire to slightly reform California’s strict term limits. 
A second effort to reform California’s current law came in the form of another initiative 
constitutional amendment on the February 2008 statewide primary election.77  Although 
Proposition 93 would have reduced the number of years an elected official was allowed to serve in 
the California Legislature from fourteen to twelve years, it allowed all twelve years to be served in 
just one legislative house.78  Supporters of Proposition 93 argued it “necessary to stop the constant 
turnover in the Legislature . . . thereby preventing entrenchment and simultaneously allowing 
members to develop their policymaking expertise and leadership skills.”79  Failing by a margin of 
7.2%80
 
, the proposition is indicative of voters’ realization of the need to increase institutional 
memory and executive oversight as well as encourage long-term policymaking. 
 The upcoming June 2012 election will feature Proposition 28, strikingly similar to 
Proposition 93, and again aimed at reforming California’s current legislative term limits.  If 
passed, Proposition 28 would reduce the total number of years elected officials may serve in the 
legislature from fourteen to twelve years, but permit service in either the Senate or Assembly or a 
combination of both.81
                                                 
73 Peter Perkins, Proposition 45: Legislative Term Limits. Local Voter Petitions, Cal. Init. Rev., (2001). 
  Despite this being the third attempt to alter California’s strict term limits, it 
74 California Proposition 45, Extended Terms in Office via Petition (March 2002), BALLOTPEDIA (February 12, 2012), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_45,_Extended_Terms_in_Office_via_Petition_(Marc
h_2002). 
75 Secretary of State, California Primary Election: Official Voter Information Guide, 67 (2002), 
http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2002p.pdf, (accessed February 19, 2012). 
76 Id. at 29. 





79 Liou and McKinney. 
80 California Proposition 93, Amendment to Term Limit Law (February 2008). 
81 California Secretary of State, June 2012 Statewide Ballot Measures: Proposition 28, (February 19, 2012), 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/qualified-ballot-measures.htm 
 
seems the electorate is slowly grasping the effects of Proposition 140.  Proposition 45 and 
Proposition 93 were narrowly defeated, which may suggest a current trend among voters, still 
desiring a check on “career” politicians, yet valuing the importance of collective expertise and 
experienced policymaking among our political leaders. 
 
 
IV. PREDICTING CURRENT PUBLIC OPINION  
 
Although California voters may be leaning towards extending term limits previously 
adopted via the initiative process, accessing current national public opinion on the subject is 
difficult (as polling on the subject is sparse).  It is evident Americans favor term limits for 
members of the United States Congress; however, the exact number of terms the electorate desires 
is unclear.  One relatively recent poll performed by a Rasmussen Reports national telephone 
survey conducted in September 2011 found 71% of likely U.S. voters favored establishing term 
limits for Congress.82  This number is likely the result of the public’s extreme disapproval of 
Congress’ job and continued partisan gridlock.83  Another poll conducted by Fox News in 




However, even less polling exists on the national electorate’s opinion concerning term 
limits for their own state legislators.  In a less recent poll, from March 4, 2008, 68% of South 
Dakotans did not want to eliminate or extend the current legislative term limit of eight years.85  
Additionally, an August 2010 poll proved 73% of New York voters favored restoring the two-term 
limit for elected officials.86  Lastly, a poll conducted in North Carolina in September 2011 found 
the majority of voters think the terms of state House and Senate leaders should be limited: 13% 
think one two-year term, 38% think two two-year terms, 20% think three two-year terms, and 14% 
think four two-year terms.87
                                                 




83 CNN/ORC POLL, 3 (February 10-13, 2010), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/02/15/rel2f.pdf (finding 77 
percent of Americans disapprove of the way Republican leaders in Congress are handling their jobs and 67 percent 
of American disapprove of the way Democratic leaders in Congress are handling their jobs). 
84 Dana Blanton, Fox News Poll: 78 Percent Favor Term Limits On Congress, FOX NEWS (September 3, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/03/fox-news-poll-percent-favor-term-limits-congress/. 
85 South Dakotans Still Support Term Limits, U.S. TERM LIMITS (March 2008), 
http://www.termlimits.org/content.asp?admin=Y&contentid=7. 
86 Michael Barbaro and Marjorie Connelly, New Yorkers Strongly Back Shorter Term Limits, NY TIMES (September 6, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/nyregion/07term.html. 
87 Trout, Katie, Civitas Poll: Voters Support Term Limits for Legislative Leaders, JOHN W. POPE CIVITAS INSTITUTE 
(October 6, 2011), https://www.nccivitas.org/2011/civitas-poll-voters-support-for-term-limits-for-legislative-
leaders/. 
 
In the aggregate, taking into account these numbers as well as the fifteen states with term 
limits adopted by initiatives, the evidence points to the public’s desire to impose some check on 
their political leaders.  However, the question regarding the number of terms the electorate prefers 
is ambiguous.  In analyzing the efforts in California – specifically the past two defeated initiatives 
and the upcoming Proposition 28 – to extend the length legislators may serve in one house, there 





Term limits imposed by the initiative system were spurred by a desire to bring new ideas to 
politics and policymaking in state legislatures, which the public perceived to be dominated by 
“career” politicians who were far removed from their constituents.  At the height of the political 
reform movement of the 1980s and 1990s, it seemed the electorate had had refused to the 
influences of powerful lobbyists and money from special interests playing a hand in the political 
process.  In theory, legislative term limits seem to be necessary, providing an essential check on 
legislators, creating transparency and accountability, while also opening up the door for minorities.  
However as exemplified in California, strict term limits fail to eliminate outside influences and 
diminish the level of expertise in complex policymaking legislatures require to function 
effectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
